For China and India, Diplomacy Meets Competition
9 April 2015
Chinese troops provoked
a confrontation with India’s soldiers twice last month in Ladakh,
according to reports that surfaced over the weekend. The
incursions—elements of China’s People’s Liberation Army advanced south
over the Line of Actual Control into Indian-controlled territory—took
place in the same area as an incident in April 2013 that roiled
relations between the two nations. The line, a little more than 4,000
kilometers long, serves as a de facto border between India and China.
The provocations last month—on March 20th and 28th—were reported to be on the agenda when Indian Defense Secretary R. K. Mathur and his team sat down with Chinese officials in Beijing Wednesday and Thursday for preliminary talks. The discussions took place before their seventh annual dialogue, to be held on Friday.
Despite their severity, the border violations in the Himalayas do not look like they will derail relations between China and India. The two sides, after all, are now in cooperation mode. This week, for instance, they were scheduled to discuss raising the level of their military cooperation, specifically holding joint naval drills, which would complement their annual “Hand in Hand” army exercises.
The defense talks precede Narendra Modi’s visit to China next month, his first trip there as India’s prime minister, and come after another round of border talks, the 18th so far.
Why is India trying so hard to keep tensions down? Modi thinks his country will own the 21st century, so he is waiting China out.
The two countries are typically characterized as “rising powers,” but China is beset by, among other problems, a slowing economy, a degraded environment, and accelerated demographic decline. Furthermore, its political system is beginning to show signs of fracture as Xi breaks party conventions and understandings designed three decades ago to maintain stability.
India, on the other hand, is resurgent, pushed forward by Modi and an increasingly confident political establishment now moving beyond its defeat at the hands of China in the 1962 border war.
There’s a reason for the recent spring in India’s step. In the past, China’s troops were able to move south of the Line of Actual Control for days without challenge by Indian forces. In March, Indian troops quickly met the Chinese soldiers and pushed them back across the line. Modi, since becoming India’s leader last May, has rushed to bulk up his country’s ability to defend its northern territory. Nitin Gokhale, a New Delhi–based journalist and defense analyst, told me that these days the Indian troops along the Line of Actual Control are often better-supplied than the People’s Liberation Army.
As India strengthens its forces in Ladakh, the number of Chinese incursions is bound to fall. That does not mean Beijing will stop testing New Delhi. In all probability, the area of contest will shift south to the Indian Ocean, especially in light of Xi’s “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” initiative, which seeks to connect China’s ports to Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. That goal competes with two Indian initiatives, the “Mausam” project and the “Spice Route of India,” both Indian-centered reconnections of historic sea routes in Asia, Europe, and Africa.
How do these initiatives clash? Both giants are vying to project influence in the Indian Ocean and surrounding areas, with Sri Lanka as the most recent area of competition.
New Delhi was especially concerned by port calls by Chinese war ships there. In September, a Chinese diesel-powered Song-class submarine docked at Colombo, the Sri Lankan capital and port facing India, along with a sub tender, the Changxing Dao, from China’s North Sea Fleet. The Song’s passage through the Indian Ocean was the first known passage by one of China’s conventionally powered subs, and the stopover was the first foreign port call for a diesel Chinese sub. Early the following month, Beijing announced that a Shang-class nuclear-powered attack sub would join anti-piracy patrols off the Yemini port of Aden, an indication that Beijing intended its subs to maintain a continuous presence in the Indian Ocean. Also in October, the Changxing Dao returned to Colombo with a submarine, which may have been the same Song-class boat or, according to some reports, a nuclear-powered one.
In January, Beijing suffered a setback in its goal of using Sri Lankan facilities when pro-China President Mahinda Rajapaksa lost snap elections. The new government has put a Chinese-backed port project on hold.
After the sudden change in government in Colombo, Beijing has shown more sensitivity for New Delhi’s concerns. “China is ready to work with South Asian countries, including India, Sri Lanka, to strengthen policy communication, identify the meeting point of their development strategies, explore effective ways of mutually beneficial cooperation and common benefit of the region, countries and the people,” said Hua Chunying, foreign ministry spokeswoman, responding to a question on India’s Spice Road and Mausam initiatives.
Xi last month proposed a trilateral meeting involving his country, Modi’s, and Sri Lanka.
Two giants are increasingly seeking to exert influence abroad, and, as they do so, are coming into frequent contact. Despite their troubled relations in the past, each is learning to accommodate the other, at least for the time being.
The provocations last month—on March 20th and 28th—were reported to be on the agenda when Indian Defense Secretary R. K. Mathur and his team sat down with Chinese officials in Beijing Wednesday and Thursday for preliminary talks. The discussions took place before their seventh annual dialogue, to be held on Friday.
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PrintDespite their severity, the border violations in the Himalayas do not look like they will derail relations between China and India. The two sides, after all, are now in cooperation mode. This week, for instance, they were scheduled to discuss raising the level of their military cooperation, specifically holding joint naval drills, which would complement their annual “Hand in Hand” army exercises.
The defense talks precede Narendra Modi’s visit to China next month, his first trip there as India’s prime minister, and come after another round of border talks, the 18th so far.
Why is India trying so hard to keep tensions down? Modi thinks his country will own the 21st century, so he is waiting China out.
The two countries are typically characterized as “rising powers,” but China is beset by, among other problems, a slowing economy, a degraded environment, and accelerated demographic decline. Furthermore, its political system is beginning to show signs of fracture as Xi breaks party conventions and understandings designed three decades ago to maintain stability.
India, on the other hand, is resurgent, pushed forward by Modi and an increasingly confident political establishment now moving beyond its defeat at the hands of China in the 1962 border war.
There’s a reason for the recent spring in India’s step. In the past, China’s troops were able to move south of the Line of Actual Control for days without challenge by Indian forces. In March, Indian troops quickly met the Chinese soldiers and pushed them back across the line. Modi, since becoming India’s leader last May, has rushed to bulk up his country’s ability to defend its northern territory. Nitin Gokhale, a New Delhi–based journalist and defense analyst, told me that these days the Indian troops along the Line of Actual Control are often better-supplied than the People’s Liberation Army.
As India strengthens its forces in Ladakh, the number of Chinese incursions is bound to fall. That does not mean Beijing will stop testing New Delhi. In all probability, the area of contest will shift south to the Indian Ocean, especially in light of Xi’s “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” initiative, which seeks to connect China’s ports to Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. That goal competes with two Indian initiatives, the “Mausam” project and the “Spice Route of India,” both Indian-centered reconnections of historic sea routes in Asia, Europe, and Africa.
How do these initiatives clash? Both giants are vying to project influence in the Indian Ocean and surrounding areas, with Sri Lanka as the most recent area of competition.
New Delhi was especially concerned by port calls by Chinese war ships there. In September, a Chinese diesel-powered Song-class submarine docked at Colombo, the Sri Lankan capital and port facing India, along with a sub tender, the Changxing Dao, from China’s North Sea Fleet. The Song’s passage through the Indian Ocean was the first known passage by one of China’s conventionally powered subs, and the stopover was the first foreign port call for a diesel Chinese sub. Early the following month, Beijing announced that a Shang-class nuclear-powered attack sub would join anti-piracy patrols off the Yemini port of Aden, an indication that Beijing intended its subs to maintain a continuous presence in the Indian Ocean. Also in October, the Changxing Dao returned to Colombo with a submarine, which may have been the same Song-class boat or, according to some reports, a nuclear-powered one.
In January, Beijing suffered a setback in its goal of using Sri Lankan facilities when pro-China President Mahinda Rajapaksa lost snap elections. The new government has put a Chinese-backed port project on hold.
After the sudden change in government in Colombo, Beijing has shown more sensitivity for New Delhi’s concerns. “China is ready to work with South Asian countries, including India, Sri Lanka, to strengthen policy communication, identify the meeting point of their development strategies, explore effective ways of mutually beneficial cooperation and common benefit of the region, countries and the people,” said Hua Chunying, foreign ministry spokeswoman, responding to a question on India’s Spice Road and Mausam initiatives.
Xi last month proposed a trilateral meeting involving his country, Modi’s, and Sri Lanka.
Two giants are increasingly seeking to exert influence abroad, and, as they do so, are coming into frequent contact. Despite their troubled relations in the past, each is learning to accommodate the other, at least for the time being.
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